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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF DNA EVIDENCE IN
WASHINGTON AFTER STATE v. CA UTHRON
Elizabeth A. Allen
Abstract: In State v. Cauthron, the Washington Supreme Court issued its first opinion
concerning forensic DNA evidence. The court clearly held that the principles underlying
DNA evidence and the restricted fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) method of DNA
typing are generally accepted in the scientific community and are therefore admissible under
the Frye test. The court refused to find that the trial court had properly admitted DNA
evidence, however, because testimony that the suspect's DNA "matched" the perpetrator's
was not supported by probability statistics. This Note demonstrates that the court was unclear
in its discussion of when probability statistics meet the Frye test, leaving other courts with
little guidance. This Note thus proposes that courts should admit DNA evidence supported by
conservative probability statistics.
"The tivofold aim of criminal justice is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer. "'
With the introduction of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) typing
evidence2 into the process of criminal investigations in the mid-1980s,3
scientists and lawyers alike realized they had discovered a valuable
evidentiary tool for differentiating the guilty from the innocent. The
Washington Supreme Court scrutinized this tool in a case reviewing the
DNA typing evidence (DNA evidence) admitted in a Snohomish County
rape trial. In 1986 and 1987, an unknown criminal committed a series of
20-25 rapes in Everett, Washington.4 In each case, the rapist wore a
mask and cloth gloves and carried a small black handgun.5 In 1988, the
police arrested Richard Cauthron for these crimes.6 A search of the
bushes where they found Cauthron revealed a ski mask, a pair of green
1. United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 640 (D.C. 1992) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
2. DNA evidence usually comes from genetic material in hair, skin, blood, or semen found at
crime scenes. DNA typing, for forensic purposes, involves comparing the genetic characteristics
found in this evidence to the genetic characteristics of the suspect. Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d
884, 885 (Colo. 1993).
3. DNA typing was first used in casework in 1985 in the United Kingdom. It was first used by
commercial labs in the United States in 1986. Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Science,
National Research Council, DNA Technology in Forensic Science 1 (1992) [hereinafter DNA
Technology].
4. State v. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d 879, 882, 846 P.2d 502, 503 (1993).
5. Id. at 883, 846 P.2d at 503.
6. Id., 846 P.2d at 504.
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wool gloves, and a black gun that turned out to be a toy.7 In addition to
these clues, some of the most convincing evidence against Cauthron
came from the DNA in his ovm cells.8
State v. Cauthron9 is Washington's first supreme court opinion to
address concerns about forensic DNA evidence. In Cauthron, the court
held that the scientific principles underlying DNA evidence and the
restricted fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) method'0 of DNA
typing are admissible." The court reversed Cauthron's conviction,
however, and remanded the case, because testimony that Cauthron's
DNA matched the perpetrator's was not supported by interpretive
probability statistics."
This Note argues that portions of the court's analysis are confusing
and fail to clearly guide other courts considering the admissibility of
DNA evidence. Part I examines the two major components of RFLP
DNA evidence: first, the underlying scientific principles and the
processing method and, second, the probability statistics interpreting a
match. Part I also examines the Frye test for the admissibility of
scientific evidence, its adoption in Washington, and its application in and
modification by Cauthron. Part II argues that the decision is unclear and
contradictory when discussing admissibility of the Statistical component
of DNA evidence. Finally, part III contends that courts should fill the
void left by Cauthron's unclear guidance and admit DNA evidence when
conservative probability statistics are employed.
I. DNA EVIDENCE AND THE FRYE TEST
Analysis of DNA evidence includes processing DNA samples from
the suspect and the crime scene to determine if they match. Present
technology does not allow for analysis of an entire DNA molecule. 3
Therefore, scientists must determine the significance of a match by using
7. Id., 846 P.2d at 503.
8. Jolayne Houtz, DNA Evidence Faces Challenge-High Court to Air Rapist's Appeal, Seattle
Times, Sept. 18, 1991, atB1.
9. 120 Wash. 2d 879, 846 P.2d 502 (1993).
10. The RFLP method of analyzing DNA evidence, at issue in Cauth,ron, involves isolating highly
variable segments of DNA using a restriction enzyme, separating the DNA fragments, and producing
x-ray films which enable visualization of the lengths of the fragments. People v. Barney, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 731, 735-36 (Cal. Ct. App.), rev. denied, No. S028767, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 5924 (Cal. Nov.
25, 1992); see also infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
11. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d at 882, 846 P.2d at 503.
12. Id. at 909, 846 P.2d at 517.
13. Id. at 900, 846 P.2d at 512.
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probability statistics. Methods for calculating these statistics are the
prime source of controversy in the debate over the admissibility of DNA
evidence. The Cauthron court was unclear in its discussion of when
probability statistics meet the Frye test, and thus failed to provide clear
guidance for other courts.
A. The Components of and Controversy over DNA Evidence
DNA is the active substance of the genes, 4 and it determines an
individual's inherited physical characteristics. 5 Except for identical
twins, each person's DNA structure is unique. DNA molecules contain
approximately three billion base pairs, composed of the nucleic acid
molecules adenine, thymine, guanine, and cytosine. 6 A series of these
base pairs that codes a protein is called a gene.' 7 The sequence of the
base pairs determines each person's unique composition." Ninety-nine
percent of the base pairs are the same for all people, 9 giving each person
two arms, two legs, a liver, a heart, and other common characteristics.2"
Other sections of DNA are highly variable (polymorphic)."' Genes in
these polymorphic sections have two or more alternate versions called
"alleles."'2 Polymorphic genes determine hair color, eye color, and other
characteristics which vary from person to person. The method of
forensic DNA typing at issue in Cauthron involves isolating and
comparing several highly polymorphic alleles through a process called
restricted fragment length polymorphism (RFLP).23
Analyzing RFLP DNA evidence consists of two integral components:
1) processing DNA from the suspect and the crime scene to see if any of
the fragments from the two sources match, and 2) determining the
match's statistical significance. The RFLP method of processing DNA
14. DNA Technology, supra note 3, at 2.
15. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d at 891-92, 846 P.2d at 508.
16. Id.
17. State v. Lyons, 863 P.2d 1303, 1307 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
18. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d at 892, 846 P.2d at 508.
19. Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d 884, 886 (Colo. 1993).
20. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d at 892, 846 P.2d at 508-09.
21. Dan E. Krane et al., Genetic Differences at Four DNA Typing Loci in Finnish, Italian, and
Mixed Caucasian Populations, 89 Proc. Nat'l Acad. Sci. USA 10,583 (1992).
22. Fishback 851 P.2d at 886. The allele contributed by the father, for example, might be for
blue eyes, while that contributed by the mother might be for brown.
23. Id. The polymerase chain reaction (PCR) method of DNA typing, an alternative to RFLP, is
also being considered by courts. State v. Lyons, 863 P.2d 1303, 1307-08 (Or. Ct. App. 1993); see
also DNA Technology, supra note 3, at 70.
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evidence involves multiple steps that result in "autorads" or pictures of
DNA which show bands of varying lengths.24 A lab analyst visually
compares the DNA patterns on the suspect's autorad to the patterns on
autorads produced from biological crime scene material to determine
whether or not the two match. If a visual match is determined, the bands
are measured by computer analysis.' Because it is impossible to
measure the fragments to the precise number of base pairs, a margin of
error, known as a "match window," is built into the methodology.26 Two
fragments are considered to match if they differ in length by no more
than a given percentage, such as 2.5 percent of their length in base
pairs.27
Once the lab finds a match, it must determine the statistical
significance of that match. Although each person's DNA is unique when
examined as a whole (with the exception of identical twins), present
technology does not allow analysis of the entire length of the DNA
molecule.28  Testing only a fragment cannot guarantee absolute
identification. Therefore, scientists determine the significance of a match
by calculating how frequently a particular DNA profile appears by
chance in the target population.29 The statistical significance is expressed
in terms of how likely it would be for a random person in that population
to share the DNA profile evident in both the crime scene sample and the
suspect.3" For example, it might be estimated that the likelihood of a
24. The first step of RFLP processing is extracting DNA from the specimen (extraction). People
v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 735 (Cal. Ct. App.), rev, denied, No. :3028767, 1992 Cal. LEXIS
5924 (Cal. Nov. 25, 1992). The next step is cutting the DNA into fragments of varying lengths using
an enzyme (restriction). Id. For sequences of DNA that are the sme in all individuals, the
restriction enzyme will cut everyone's DNA in the same place, resulting in fragments that are
substantially the same length. People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 991 (Sup. Ct. 1989). In the
polymorphic sequences, the length of the fragments varies because of the differing numbers of base
pairs that lie between the cutting points selected by the restriction enzymes. Id. These repeat
sequences of DNA base pairs which vary in length are known as variable numbers of tandem repeats
(VNTRs). Id. The variable length fragments, cut by the enzyme, include these VNTRs and are
known as restricted fragment length polymorphisms (RFLPs). Id.
Further steps consist of separating the fragments by length, transferring fragments onto a
membrane and splitting them in half lengthwise ("southern transfer"), marking the fragments to be
measured with radioactively marked probes (hybridization), and x-rayin,7 the membrane to make an
autorad or picture of the DNA (autoradiography). Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. d at 735-36.
25. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 736.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. State v. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d 879, 900, 846 P.2d 502, 512 (1993).
29. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 736. The target population is determined by the defendant's race.
Id.
30. Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d 884, 888 (Colo. 1993).
Vol. 69:383, 1994
Admissibility of DNA Evidence
random match is one in 7.8 million' The lower the probability that
another person could share the DNA pattern evident in the crime scene
sample and the suspect, the greater the possibility that the crime scene
sample did in fact come from the suspect.
The conventional method of estimating the probability of a match
occurring by chance has been to multiply the frequencies with which the
relevant variable alleles occur in a database of samples from the
defendant's race.32 This method is known as the "product rule."33 First,
the lab calculates how frequently each allele (as it is depicted on an
autorad) is found in the target population.34  Then it calculates the
frequency of the genotype,35 or pair of alleles, at each locus36 by
multiplying the individual allele frequencies together.37 Finally, it
calculates the frequency for the complete multilocus genotype by
multiplying the genotype frequencies at each loci tested.3' For example,
the pair of alleles at site A may be found in one of every ten people; the
alleles at site B found in one of every 20; and alleles at site C in one of
five. Using the product rule, experts can multiply (1/10 x 1/20 x 1/5) to
achieve the result that only one person in every 1,000 will match all three
sites.39
The precise accuracy of the product rule depends on whether the
events multiplied are truly statistically independent. Potential problems
with a lack of independence can be illustrated with a simple example. If
a population survey of Europe showed one in ten people had red hair,
one in ten had freckles, and one in ten had fair skin, it would be wrong to
multiply these frequencies to conclude the frequency of people with all
three characteristics was one in 1,000, because they are not necessarily
independent characteristics.40 If the possibility of having these traits is
31. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 737.
32. Krane, supra note 21, at 10,583.
33. State v. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d 879,901,846 P.2d 502, 513 (1993).
34. Fishback, 851 P.2d at 888. The lab does this by categorizing each band by length, according
to a range of base pair lengths, called a bin. It then determines how often bands within that bin occur
in the target population. Id.
35. A "genotype" refers to a genetic composition, DNA Technology, supra note 3, at 169 (here, a
particular combination of two alleles).
36. A "locus" is the specific physical site of a gene on a chromosome. DNA Technology, supra
note 3, at 170.
37. Fishbac, 851 P.2d at 888.
38. DNA Technology, supra note 3, at 11.
39. State v. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d 879, 901, 846 P.2d 502, 513 (1993).
40. DNA Technology, supra note 3, at 76; see also Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d at 901-02, 846 P.2d
at 5 13.
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interrelated, then anyone who has one is more likely to have the others,
and multiplication is not valid.
Two central assumptions involved in product rule statistics have
provoked debate in the scientific community. First, the Hardy-Weinberg
equilibrium assumption assumes that the two alleles at each loci (one
from the father and one from the mother) are independent.4 ' Second, the
linkage equilibrium assumption assumes that the various loci tested are
not related.42 The debate centers around the significance and effect of
population substructure within databases used to estimate allele
frequencies. Some scientists maintain that population substructure
exists, because ethnic subgroups tend to mate with persons of like
religion, ethnicity, and geographic area.43 Such selective mating, they
say, maintains genetic differences or "substructuring" among
subgroups.' Specifically, substantial differences may exist between
allele frequencies within the subgroups and allele frequencies in the
databases.45 If significant substructure exists, it would be inappropriate
to use broad databases (databases representing multiple subgroups) to
estimate allele frequencies and inappropriate to multiply frequencies, for
lack of independence. 46 To summarize the disagreement, some scientists
maintain that significant population substructure may exist and lead to
major inaccuracies in frequency calculations.47 Others maintain that
population substructure within the databases has a "trivial" effect on the
reliability of frequency estimates that "cannot be detected in practice."'
41. Fishback 851 P.2d at 888.
42. Id.
43. People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 740 (Cal. Ct. App), rev. denied, No. S028767, 1992
Cal. LEXIS 5924 (Cal. Nov. 25, 1992).
44. Id.
45. Id. (A given allele may be common in some subgroups but not in the broader database).
46. Id. To illustrate with a hypothetical example: assume a specific ethnic minority made up ten
percent of a database, the minority group members all shared the same allele at each of three loci
tested, and the particular alleles were absent in the other populations contained in the database, In
this case, a study of the database would show that each minority allele had a frequency of ten
percent. Applying the product rule, the probability of an individual being homozygous for all three
minority alleles would be calculated at one in one million. If we did not know that the true
frequency was one in ten for the minority members, we might be persuaded to convict a minority
suspect on the bases of the DNA match. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d at 903-04, 846 P.2d at 514; see
also DNA Technology, supra note 3, at 11 (providing other hypothetical numbers).
47. See R.C. Lewontin & Daniel L. Hartl, Population Genetics i, Forensic DNA Typing 254
Science 1745 (1991) (absence of population substructure cannot be -ssumed but must be proved
empirically).
48. See Ranajit Chakraborty & Kenneth K. Kidd, The Utility of DNA Typing in Forensic Work
254 Science 1735 (1991).
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By 1989, criminal cases and scientific articles had raised "a crescendo
of questions"' 9 concerning DNA evidence. Many of these questions
concerned statistical calculations. In response to these and other
concerns about DNA evidence, the National Research Council (NRC) of
the National Academy of Sciences initiated a study in 1990 to address all
aspects of forensic DNA typing and to provide specific recommendations
for improvement. The study resulted in a report (NRC report) issued in
April 1992 by the Council's Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic
Science (the NRC committee).5
Although aware of the opposing views on the significance of
population substructure and its effect on the product rule, the NRC
committee chose to assume that population substructure may exist." The
committee then proposed a method of calculating population statistics
that accounts for substructure. The statistical method recommended by
the committee is the ceiling principle. 2 The ceiling principle is designed
to yield conservative estimates that err in favor of criminal defendants.
A conservative estimate is produced if allele frequencies used to
calculate the significance of a match exceed allele frequencies actually
observed in any of 15 to 20 reference population subgroups. 3 Using a
higher allele frequency than what is actually observed increases the
calculated probability that the DNA pattern from the crime scene sample
and the suspect could also be shared by a random person. Until adequate
samples from population subgroups have been collected for use in ceiling
49. DNA Technology, supra note 3, at vii.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 80 (assuming existence of'population substructure "for the sake of discussion").
52. Id. at 13.
53. Id. Thus, using the ceiling principle, the allele frequency used in the statistical calculation is
either 1) the maximum frequency observed for that allele in a sample of at least 100 randomly
selected persons from each of 15-20 relatively homogeneous subpopulations or 2) five percent,
whichever is larger. Id. Suppose that one locus, composed of alleles c and d, has been studied in
three population samples, with the following results:
Population I Population 2 Population 3
Allele c 3 percent 4 percent 4 percent
Allele d 2 percent 15 percent 7 percent
The ceiling principle would assign ceiling values of 5 percent for allele c and 15 percent for allele
d. The frequency for allele c is 5 percent, rather than 4 percent, to reflect the recommended lower
bound of 5 percent. Id. at 83.
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principle calculations, the committee recommended that a modified or
interim ceiling principle be used.54
Although the NRC study was intended to help settle controversy over
such aspects of DNA evidence as probability statistics, the report actually
has generated further debate.5 The varied outcomes of subsequent
judicial decisions demonstrate the NRC's failure to provide the final
word on all aspects of DNA evidence, especially probability statistics."
After the study was published, some courts continued to rule DNA
evidence admissible,57 while others ruled it inadmissible. 8 Many
appellate courts have remanded the admissibility of DNA evidence for
further consideration by trial courts. 9 Several courts have indicated that
either the ceiling principle or interim ceiling principle has received
general acceptance in the scientific community." Other courts have
54. Id. at 14-15. The allele frequency used in the interim ceiling principle calculation would be
either 1) the 95-percent upper confidence limit on the maximum frequency observed among at least
three ethnically or racially distinct databases, such as Caucasians, Hispanics, and Asians or 2) 10
percent, whichever is larger. Id. Use of the 95-percent upper confiderce limit implies that the true
allele frequency has only a 5-percent chance of exceeding the upper bound. Id. at 9.
55. The controversy following the report has led to the convening of another NRC committee for
a second examination of the issues. B.S. Weir, Book Reviews, 53 Am. J. Hum. Genet. 1158, 1158
(1993).
56. Difference in outcomes is also affected by the fact that some courts use the Frye test, while
others use the Federal Rules of Evidence approach. See infra note 67 and accompanying text,
discussing the Federal Rules approach to admissibility.
57. See, e.g., Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d 884, 894 (Colo. 1993); Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69,
76 (Del. 1993) (DNA evidence admissible only with population statistizs); State v. Dykes, 847 P.2d
1214, 1218 (Kan. 1993); State v. Futch, 860 P.2d 264, 270 (Or. Ct. App. 1993); Springfield v. State,
860 P.2d 435, 444, 448 (Wyo. 1993).
58. See, e.g., State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1190 (Ariz. 1993) (statistics inadmissible); People v.
Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 745 (Cal. Ct. App.), rev. denied, No. S023767, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 5924
(Cal. Nov. 25, 1992); People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 725 (Cal. Ct. App.), rev. denied, No.
S032549, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 3381 (Cal. June 24, 1993); Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d 311,
317 (Mass. 1992); State v. Anderson, 853 P.2d 135, 146-47 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. granted 848 P.2d
531 (N.M. 1993).
59. See, e.g., People v. Pizarro, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 436, 461 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), rev. denied,
S019923, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 253 (Cal. Jan. 21, 1993); United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 644
(D.C. 1992); State v. Houser, 490 N.W.2d 168, 184 (Neb. 1992); State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d
483, 495 (N.H. 1992) (remanding specifically for hearing to deterraine whether NRC's ceiling
principle is generally accepted).
60. United States v. Bridgett, 120 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 1697, 1702 (Super. Ct. D.C. 1992) (stating
that the NRC committee's conclusions could be equated with general acceptance in the relevant
scientific communities); State v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d 38, 51 (Minn. CL App.), rev. granted in part, 505
N.W.2d 72 (Minn. 1993).
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expressed hope for consensus on a conservative statistical methodology"
that would lead to admissibility of DNA evidence.
B. The Frye Test for Admissibility of Scientific Evidence
In deciding the admissibility of DNA evidence and other novel
scientific evidence, Washington and many other states employ the Frye
test, first articulated in a 1923 case concerning the admissibility of
polygraph evidence.62 Courts employ the Frye test to ensure the
trustworthiness of scientific theories, such as DNA typing, before
allowing a jury to hear them. Impressed by the seeming infallibility of
scientific evidence, jurors may overemphasize expert testimony based on
scientific principles.63 Under the Frye test, courts can admit novel
scientific theories and techniques only after they have gained general
acceptance within the relevant scientific community.' Once a
jurisdiction's high court determines that evidence is admissible under
Frye, other courts within the jurisdiction may admit that evidence
without further hearings, unless new scientific evidence arises.65
The Washington Supreme Court explicitly adopted the Frye test for
the first time in State v. Canaday,66 and in Cauthron the court renewed
its adherence to Frye. The Cauthron court explicitly chose not to follow
the less conservative relevance approach of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.67 It reasoned that, under Frye, courts are less likely to admit
61. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 745 (stating that DNA evidence is likely to be admissible if
statistics are calculated according to ceiling principle); Porter, 618 A.2d at 642 (finding it probable,
in light of recent events, that a conservative consensus can be found); Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d at 316.
But see Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 725 (noting recent developments have shown general acceptance
of the ceiling principle may not be easily achieved).
62. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
63. Robert H. Aronson, The Law of Evidence in Washington § 702-9 (2d ed. 1993).
64. The Frye test is stated within the following much quoted passage of the Frye opinion:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and
demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force
of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the particularfield in which it belongs.
Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added).
65. State v. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d 879, 888 n.3, 879 P.2d 502, 506 n.3 (1993).
66. 90 Wash. 2d 808, 812-13, 585 P.2d 1185, 1188 (1978). The court implicitly adopted Frye in
State v. Woo, 84 Wash. 2d 472, 473, 527 P.2d 271,272 (1974).
67. State v. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d at 886, 846 P.2d at 505. Proponents of the Federal Rules
approach maintain that the policies behind Frye are addressed by Rule 702 (requiring that expert
testimony assist the trier of fact), Rule 703 (requiring that the facts or data be "of a type reasonably
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questionable scientific evidence.68 The court restricted the Frye analysis
to the issue of whether or not the evidence being offered is based on an
accepted theory and valid technique to implement that theory.69 Under
Cauthron's characterization of Frye, a "significant dispute between
qualified experts as to the validity of scientific evidence" precludes its
admission.7" The court held that whether an expert is qualified and
whether expert testimony would be helpful to the trer of fact should be
analyzed separately under Evidence Rule 702, making the Frye test a
threshold inquiry." The separation is important, because it allowed the
Cauthron court to hold that its standard of review for a trial court's Frye
holding will be de novo, while maintaining an abuse of discretion
standard for the Evidence Rule 702 ruling.72
Applying the Frye standard for admissibility, the Cauthron court held
that the scientific principle underlying DNA evidence and the RFLP
method of DNA typing are generally accepted and therefore admissible.
73
Nonetheless, the court concluded that testimony of a match in Cauthron's
case could not be admitted. It held the significance of such testimony
depended on probability statistics,74 which the prosecution did not offer
at trial.75 Without probability statistics, the court found testimony of a
match did not meet the Frye test, nor did it meet Evidence Rule 702's
relied upon by experts in the particular field"), and 403 (excluding evidence causing undue prejudice
or confusion). See Aronson, supra note 63, at § 702-10. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the
Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules. Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
68. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d at 886 n.2, 846 P.2d at 505 n.2.
69. Id. at 889, 846 P.2d at 507.
70. Id. at 887, 846 P.2d at 505.
71. Id. at 890, 846 P.2d at 507. Eliminating the issue of general acceptance in the scientific
community from Washington Evidence Rule 702 analysis overrules those Washington decisions
which had included it as the second prong of a three-part Evidence Rule 702 analysis. See, e.g.,
State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 596, 682 P.2d 312, 315 (1984) (lTolding that admissibility of
expert testimony depends on whether 1) the witness qualified as an expart, 2) the witness based her
opinion on an explanatory theory generally accepted in the scientific community, and 3) the expert
testimony would be helpful to the trier of fact).
72. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d at 885, 846 P.2d at 504-05. Under the de novo standard applied to
the Frye inquiry, courts may look beyond evidence in the record to other cases and articles they find
relevant. Id. at 887-88, 846 P.2d at 505-06.
73. Id. at 882, 846 P.2d at 503.
74. Id. at 906-07, 846 P.2d at 516 (quoting DNA Technology, supra note 3, at 74) ("To say that
two patterns match, without providing any scientifically valid estimate ... of the frequency with
which such matches might occur by chance, is meaningless.").
75. Id. at 907, 846 P.2d at 515-16.
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requirement that evidence be helpful to the trier of fact.76 Therefore, the
court reversed Cauthron's conviction and remanded the case to the trial
court for further consideration of probability statistics."
Given that the prosecution in Cauthron rested without providing any
evidence of population statistics, 8 the court was obligated to remand
once it concluded that probability statistics are integral to testimony of a
match. The court was unclear, however, on whether it was remanding
for a full Frye hearing on the general acceptance of probability statistics
or whether it was remanding simply for consideration of whether the
probability statistics available in Cauthron, but not presented,79
conformed to a particular accepted methodology, such as the ceiling
principle. This lack of clarity is likely to produce confusion for courts in
the future.
II. THE CA UTHRONDECISION PROVIDES MINIMAL
GUIDANCE ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF PROBABILITY
STATISTICS
On the issue of when probability statistics meet the Frye test, courts
and attorneys can interpret Cauthron two different ways. On one hand,
Cauthron can be read as declining to decide whether any method of
calculating probability statistics meets Frye and remanding for a full
Frye hearing on that question. On the other hand, Cauthron also hints
that the ceiling principle has found general acceptance. By suggesting
such conflicting conclusions, the court failed to clarify the issues for the
trial court and for other courts looking at Cauthron for guidance.8"
76. Id.
77. Id. at 909, 846 P.2d at 517.
78. Id. at 906, 846 P.2d at 516. Ellen Wijsman of the Department of Theoretical Genetics at the
University of Washington testified at the Frye hearing that the statistical likelihood of two persons
having the same DNA as the sample in question was one in 233 billion. Cauthron's counsel
requested the statistical data be excluded at trial. The prosecutor "in effect, complied with this
request," so the "probability of two persons having identical autorads never reached the jury." See
Brief of Amicus Curiae Cellmark Diagnostics at 41-42, State v. Cauthron, (No. 58282-3)
[hereinafter Amicus Brief].
79. See Amicus Brief, supra note 78.
80. In addition to Washington courts, courts in other states have looked to Cauthron for guidance.
See, e.g., State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1188 (Ariz. 1993) (citing Cauthron as confirming a lack of
general acceptance for the Cellmark laboratory's statistical calculations); State v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d
38, 50 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Cauthron's discussion of the ceiling principle and its
acceptance in "appropriate circumstances"), rev. granted in part, 505 N.W.2d 72 (Minn. Sept. 21,
1993).
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Under one interpretation, the Cauthron court appears to have simply
declined to decide when probability statistics meet the Frye test, leaving
the issue for full Frye consideration on remand and in other trial courts.
This interpretation-that the court intended to remand the issue of
probability statistics for full Frye consideration-is suggested early in
the Cauthron opinion. First, the court noted disagreement in the
scientific community over the calculation of prDbability statistics."'
Second, the court concluded that expert testimony of a match was
admitted in error, since it was not accompanied by statistical
verification.82 Finally, the court remanded the case fbr reconsideration of
the statistical evidence, in light of current scientific knowledge.83 The
court's highlighting of the disagreement in the scientific community over
probability statistics and of current scientific knowledge on probability
statistics suggests the court was requiring a full hearing on the general
acceptance of probability statistics.
In addition, assuming the court declined to decide the general
acceptance of probability statistics makes sense in light of the limited
information available to an appellate court. An appellate court does not
benefit from live expert testimony.84 Furthermore, very few "post NRC
report" cases at the time of Cauthron had held that any particular method
of calculating probability statistics met Frye,85 making it difficult for the
Cauthron court to incorporate the work of other courts by reference.
Interpreting Cauthron to require a full Frye hearing on probability
statistics would be consistent with other Frye appellate decisions issued
soon after the release of the NRC report and also remanding the
probability statistics issue.86
Embedded within the court's remand on the general acceptance of
probability statistics, however, is a confusing reference to the ceiling
principle. Cauthron seemed to answer its own remanded question (Is
there a generally accepted method of calculating probability statistics?)
by stating that the ceiling principle, preceded by the interim ceiling
principle, has achieved general acceptance. The ccurt noted the NRC's
81. State v. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d 879, 886, 846 P.2d 502, 505 (19?3).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Jones v. United States, 548 A.2d 35, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cited a Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d at
887, 846 P.2d at 505.
85. One published trial court opinion held that the ceiling principle has general acceptance,
equating the NRC's conclusions with general acceptance in the scientific community. United States
v. Bridgett, 120 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 1697, 1702 (Super. Ct. D.C. 1992).
86. See supra note 59.
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adoption of the ceiling principle and the interim ceiling principle.8 7 In
the next sentence, the court admitted its lack of scientific expertise on the
mechanics of the methodology, but wrote that adoption of the
methodology by the committee indicates sufficient acceptance to satisfy
Frye "in appropriate circumstances."" The court was clearly referring to
the ceiling principle and interim ceiling principle as the methodology
accepted by the committee. Furthermore, the court earlier stated that,
because of the broad range of scientists represented on the committee,
acceptance by the committee indicates the general acceptance required
by Frye.9 Thus, the court concluded that the ceiling principle and
interim ceiling principle are generally accepted and meet Frye in
appropriate circumstances. Following this interpretation, trial courts
might rely on Cauthron to accept probability statistics, and thus DNA
evidence in its entirety, when the ceiling principle or something
comparably conservative is employed.
The confusion produced by Cauthron is evidenced by the holdings of
trial courts interpreting it. Shortly after the publication of Cauthron, at
least one trial court in Washington conducted a full Frye hearing on the
admissibility of DNA evidence.9" In a memorandum disposition, the
court interpreted Cauthron to have "directed an independent Frye
consideration for [population statistics]."'" The court wrote:
I continue to believe that the most clear direction which Cauthron
gave to the trial court was to proceed to determine whether there
was a method of statistical calculation which could assume general
acceptance in the scientific community .... And that is a Frye
inquiry.
92
On the other hand, the trial court on remand in Cauthron relied on the
supreme court's decision to hold that the interim ceiling principle would
satisfy the Frye test.93 The trial court, however, held that any variation
from the interim ceiling principle would require a Frye hearing.94 It
87. State v. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d 879, 908, 846 P.2d 502, 517 (1993).
88. Id. at 908-09, 846 P.2d at 517.
89. Id. at 895, 846 P.2d at 510.
90. State v. HollisiDeFroe, Nos. 92-1-04603-9 and 92-1-03699-8 (King County Super. Ct. 1993).
91. Transcript of Memorandum Opinion at 8, State v. Hollis/DeFroe, Nos. 92-1-04603-9 and 92-
1-03699-8 (King County Super. Ct. 1993).
92. Id. at 9-10.
93. Court Order, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Granting State's Motion to Strike
DNA Frye Hearing, State v. Cauthron, No. 88-1-01253-3 (Snohomish County Super. Ct. 1993).
94. Transcript of Pre-Trial Hearing at 5, State v. Cauthron, No. 88-1-01253-3 (Snohomish County
Super. Ct. 1993).
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rejected the State's farther reaching interpretation that any statistical
method that was as conservative or more conservative than the interim
ceiling principle would meet the Frye test.95
The supreme court in Cauthron had to remand the issue of probability
statistics, since statistics were not offered at trial. Still, because of its
confusing discussion of the issue, other courts have little guidance on
when the admission of probability statistics, and thus; any DNA evidence,
is appropriate.
III. COURTS SHOULD ADMIT DNA EVIDENCE WHEN
SUPPORTED BY CONSERVATIVE PROBABILITY
STATISTICS
Because Cauthron held that testimony of a match is inadmissible
without probability statistics, lower court rulings on the admissibility of
probability statistics will determine whether juries hear DNA evidence at
all. After Cauthron, DNA evidence should be admitted when analyzed
according to conservative probability statistics. Conservative methods of
calculating probability statistics meet the Frye test. Comparisons to
other forms of scientific evidence show that courts can address concerns
about reliability and undue prejudice by admitting only conservative
probability statistics, rather than by excluding DNA evidence altogether.
A. Conservative Probability Statistics Provide the Courtroom
Reliability Required by Frye
As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., "there are important differences between the quest
for truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory."
'9 6
Frye does not require a perfect version of scientific evidence. Neither
does it require absolute consensus within the scientific community.
1. Frye Does Not Demand Certainty
The Frye threshold test of admissibility does nol require the exacting
precision of an isolated laboratory. 97 Instead, it requires a version of
95. Id. at 9.
96. 113 S. Ct. 2786,2798 (1993).
97. See People v. Mohit, 579 N.Y.S.2d 990, 993 (Westchester County Ct. 1992) (implying
probability statistics should be admitted even if most scientists would consider the estimates too
conservative); Commonwealth v. Cumin, 565 N.E.2d 440, 445 (Mass. 1991) (implying that DNA
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scientific evidence that is generally accepted as reliable for the purpose
of avoiding undue prejudice against a criminal defendant in the
courtroom.98 Presenting conservative probability statistics meets this
standard by allowing the prosecution to bring important evidence to a
jury's attention, yet eliminating undue prejudice by presenting statistics
that err in favor of defendants.
That Frye does not require total certainty is shown by the fact that
other forms of scientific evidence that are not absolutely precise have
been admitted when their probative value outweighs problems of
precision. For example, as with DNA evidence, breathalyzer test results
must undergo scientific manipulation before they can be applied in a
helpful way to a particular case. A formula must be used to convert
breath-alcohol level to blood-alcohol level. The exact number to be used
as a multiplier is debatable due to variability among individuals and
within the same individual over time. Furthermore, moving from
estimated blood concentration at the time of the test to a correct
statement of the degree of intoxication during the time of driving
increases the potential for imprecision, because individuals' alcohol
tolerances, absorption rates, and clearance rates vary. Still, courts have
admitted breathalyzer test results under Frye when authenticated and
when satisfactory care is taken in collection and analysis.99
Similarly, spectrographic voice identification, a technique analyzing
the frequency of sound waves to identify a speaker, is subject to
uncertainty. In a federal court of appeals case, the court noted that no
voice is 100-percent unique, studies indicate that the spectrographic
evidence will be admitted when the scientific community can generally agree on a conservative
estimate); United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 642 (D.C. 1992) (same).
98. Even if DNA evidence is generally accepted under the Frye threshold test, it must still be
admissible under Evidence Rule 702 and Evidence Rule 403. These latter determinations, requiring
that evidence assist the trier of fact and be more probative than prejudicial, depend on the facts of
each case.
99. See People v. Nieves, 541 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1010, 1013 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1989) (stating that
questions regarding conversion ratio accuracy go to weight); State v. Richards, 378 N.W.2d 259, 261
(S.D. 1985). In Washington, breathalyzer results were first admitted before the state's adoption of
the Frye test. State v. Baker, 56 Wash. 2d 846, 852, 355 P.2d 806, 809-10 (1960).
The Washington Supreme Court gave its approval to the DataMaster breath analysis computer
verifier, a replacement of the familiar breathalyzer, in State v. Ford, 110 Wash. 2d 827, 755 P.2d 806
(1988). Though the court did not refer to the Frye test explicitly, the case was decided after
Washington's adoption of the test. Furthermore, the court used Frye language, holding that "the
scientific principles of infrared spectroscopy upon which these machines operate are established and
accepted. The... BAC Verifier [was] based upon those principles." See also State v. Straka, 116
Wash. 2d 859, 810 P.2d 888 (1991); McCormick on Evidence § 205(B) (John W. Strong gen. ed.,
1992).
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technique is subject to error, and no one had conducted studies involving
females of the defendant's race.100 Still, the court held that lack of
certainty need not render the technique inadmissible under Frye when
sufficient indicia of reliability are present.' t Finally, the Washington
Supreme Court has permitted testimony under Frye that items of trace
evidence, including hair, fibers, and paint chips, could have shared a
common source. 0 2  The court held that lack of certainty regarding
microanalytic techniques employed went "to the weight to be given the
testimony ... because the scientific process ... often allows no more
certain testimony."'03
DNA evidence may carry a greater aura of certainty than other forms
of evidence, even scientific evidence, but DNA evidence has survived a
high enough degree of scrutiny to warrant that certainty. The
undertaking of the NRC study' °4 and the proliferation of scientific
research on the subject of DNA evidence' demonstrate this scrutiny.
The NRC's conclusion is clear: While the process of DNA typing for
forensic purposes must undergo refinement, "[t]here is no need for a
general moratorium on the use of the results of DNA typing either in
investigation or in the courts. '  As a comparison to the admissibility of
other scientific evidence suggests, the probability statistics component of
DNA evidence does not require absolute precision to produce reliable
evidence, with a probative value that outweighs its capacity to unfairly
prejudice a jury. In most cases, odds against a match being the result of
a coincidence are extremely high, even when the most conservative
statistical calculations are used.0 7
100. United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 354 (7th Cir. 1989).
101. Id. at 352, 354.
102. State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 853, 822 P.2d 177, 192 (1991). cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 164
(1992).
103. Id.
104. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
105. See generally infra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
106. DNA Technology, supra note 3, atx.
107. Eric S. Lander, DNA Fingerprinting: The NRC Report, 260 Science 1221 (1993) ("[A]
looser standard will not significantly increase the power of forensic DNA typing, but it will likely
provoke continued litigation that will hamper the use of this important and powerful criminalistic
tool.').
In Fishback, the court stated that expert testimony of a one in 830 million probability, calculated
according to the traditional product rule, might be one in 8.3 million by more conservative standards.
851 P.2d 884, 894 n.19 (Colo. 1993). While the difference between those two probabilities may be
important for scientific purposes, either number gives more than a 99-percent certainty that a random
person would not share the same DNA profile for legal purposes. Il at 900 n.3 (Mullarkey, J.,
concurring).
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2. Frye Does Not Demand Consensus
A lack of unanimity in the scientific community does not preclude the
general acceptance required by Frye.10 8 In fact, Cauthron specifically
states that only a "significant" dispute between qualified experts
precludes admission under Frye. 9 Other courts have held that Frye is
not simply a process of counting scientific noses."0 In addition to
looking at the existence of a controversy, courts may also look at the
expertise and number of scientists involved in a dispute and the extent of
the dispute."' Therefore, the fact that scientists disagree whether
existing probability statistics methods produce conservative estimates".
does not preclude admitting DNA evidence under Frye.
B. The Admission of Scientific Evidence Can Be Limited to Proper
Circumstances
Comparisons to other scientific evidence indicate that the dual policies
of avoiding undue prejudice and ensuring reliability, which underlie the
Frye test, can be met by admitting scientific evidence only under proper
circumstances, rather than by excluding it all together. With breathalyzer
tests, for example, courts have required the state to prove that the
machine was in proper working order, the chemicals used were proper,
the operator was qualified, and the test was properly administered before
test results are admissible."' Spectrographic voice identification
In Springfield, an expert re-calculated probability statistics using the ceiling principle.
Probabilities for the black database went from one in 150 million to one in 17 million and for the
Indian database from one in 250,000 to one in 221,000. 860 P.2d 435, 438, 447 (,yo. 1993); see
also United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 642 (D.C. 1992) (stating that the odds of match occurring
by chance are high even if most conservative statistics are used).
108. "The consensus required to justify novel scientific evidence need not, however, be universal,
for there are often dissenters, even reputable dissenters, to what is scientifically valid." Richard
Lempert, Some Caveats Concerning DNA as Criminal Identification Evidence: With Thanks to the
Reverend Bayes, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 303, 336 (1991).
109. State v. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d 879, 887, 846 P.2d 502,505 (1993).
110. People v. Pizarro, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 436, 448 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1992), rev. denied, No.
S019923, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 254 (Cal. Jan. 21, 1993); see also People v. Mohit, 579 N.Y.S.2d 990,
992 (Westchester County Ct. 1992) ("'[C]ounting heads' to determine a majority view is rarely
feasible and can be of dubious value.").
111. People v. Axell, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411, 421 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), rev. denied (1992).
112. See Jennifer R. Slimowitz and Joel E. Cohen, Violations of the Ceiling Principle: Exact
Conditions and Statistical Evidence, 53 Am. J. Hum. Genet. 314 (1993).
113. State v. Straka, 116 Wash. 2d 859, 874-75, 810 P.2d 888, 895 (1991); see also State v.
Baker, 56 Wash. 2d 846, 852, 355 P.2d 806, 809-10 (1960) (establishing foundational requirements
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evidence, also subject to uncertainty, is admissible when the technique
shows a low potential rate of error, proper maintenance of standards,
careful application, and existence of "fail-safe characteristics. '1 4
Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a per se rule excluding
hypnotically aided testimony violated constitutional rights, including the
right to testify on one's own behalf, when the circumstances of the
testimony demonstrated reliability."' The court indicated that such
evidence should be admitted when the testimony is subject to verification
by corroborating evidence and is audio or video recorded." 6  Finally,
psychological profile evidence has also been admitted when limited to
appropriate circumstances. After deciding expert testimony on the
behavior of battered women met the Frye test, the Washington Supreme
Court, in State v. Ciskie, held that testimony of a behavior pattern was
admissible only when rape was not indicated as a potential cause of the
behavior." 7 Though the expert could explain the victim's failure to leave
the relationship or to complain to authorities, sh- could not use the
phrase "rape trauma syndrome.".. 8  These examples demonstrate that
scientific evidence need not be excluded when it can be properly limited.
C. Proper Circumstances for Admitting DNA Evidence
As with other kinds of scientific evidence, the probability statistics
element of DNA evidence can be limited to circumstances in which
reliability is preserved and undue prejudice is avoided. Like properly
limited breathalyzer results, voice identification eridence, hypnotically
aided testimony, and psychological profile evidence, conservative
probability statistics provide courtroom reliability and avoid undue
prejudice. Since the NRC report, many scientists and courts have come
to agree that existing statistical techniques produce conservative results,
resolving uncertainties in favor of defendants.
One conservative method of estimating probability statistics is the
counting rule. This method involves counting the occurrences of a DNA
in Washington); State v. Richards, 378 N.W.2d 259, 261 (S.D. 1985) (quoting State v. Helmer, 278
N.W.2d 808 (S.D. 1979)).
114. United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 352, 354 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v.
Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198-99 (2d. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979). Fail-safe
characteristics are characteristics the variability of which will lead to different results. Id. at 352.
115. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44,61-62 (1987).
116. Id.
117. 110 Wash. 2d 263,279-80,751 P.2d 1165, 1173-74(1988).
118. Id. at270 n.1, 751 P.2d at 1169n.1.
400
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pattern in a random sample of the appropriate population and then using
classical statistical formulas to place upper and lower confidence limits
on the estimate." 9 The upper confidence limit of the frequency should
be used in court. 2 ° Probability statistics produced by simple counting do
not depend on theoretical independence assumptions, but simply on the
comparison sample's having been randomly drawn from the appropriate
population.' Counting rule frequencies do not, however, take
advantage of the full potential of the genetic approach.'2 Because it is
impossible or impractical to compile a large enough database to calculate
a counting rule frequency much below one in 1,000, there is not
sufficient empirical data on which to base a claim that such calculations
are reliable or valid."z
In Minnesota, courts admit only the statistical frequencies of
individual loci (sites), provided they are calculated according to the
ceiling principle.'24 These courts do not admit results of the product rule,
the composite frequency of a match on all loci, for fear the jury would
use such evidence as a measure of guilt or innocence.'25 By excluding
results of the product rule, Minnesota seeks to avoid presenting an
inaccurate calculation of the likelihood of a random match, such
inaccuracy being due to lack of independence among loci, or linkage
equilibrium.'26 This approach, however, does not have the same power
as one that demonstrates the significance of a "match" at all loci tested.
119. DNA Technology, supra note 3, at 75.
If the pattern occurred in one of 100 samples, the estimated frequency would be one percent
with an upper confidence limit of 4.7 percent. If the pattern occurred in 0 of 100 samples, the
estimated frequency would be 0 percent, with an upper confidence limit of 3 percent. (The
upper bound cited is the traditional 95-percent confidence limit, [the use of which] implies that
the true frequency has only a 5-percent chance of exceeding the upper bound.)
Id. at 76.
120. See supra notes 54 and 119 for an explanation of upper confidence limit.
121. DNA Technology, supra note 3, at 76.
122. Id. While reference samples are being collected for use in the ceiling principle, the NRC
recommends reporting probability statistics according to both the counting principle and the interim
ceiling principle. Factfinders should be told when, according to the counting principle, the lab finds
no match with any sample in a total data bank of N persons. Id. at 95. People v. Barney, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 731,745 (Cal. Ct App. 1992), rev. denied, No. S028767, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 5924 (Cal. Nov.
25, 1992).
123. DNA Technology, supra note 3, at 10.
124. State v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d 38, 51 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev. granted in part, 505 N.W.2d 72
(Minn. Sept. 21, 1993) (clarifying that "the only DNA frequency evidence to be admitted at trial is
the population frequency evidence of the individual bands").
125. Id. at 53 n.25.
126. Id. at 52 n.23.
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Furthermore, juries might simply multiply the individual frequencies and
calculate the composite frequency themselves.
Finally, the ceiling principle and interim ceiling principle methods
may be used to calculate probability statistics. While some controversy
over the precise accuracy of these methods remains, 27 many population
geneticists and statisticians seem to agree at least that they produce a
conservative result. 28  Dr. Eric Lander, 129 in an affidavit filed in
Washington superior court, states:
Estimating population frequencies in accordance with the interim
ceiling principle is a standard of practice so conservative that no
serious scientific argument based on data could be made to say that
such an estimate could be biased against the defendant. 30
In fact, much of the dispute over DNA evidence lies not over whether
probability statistics like the ceiling and interim ceiling principle are
conservative enough, but over whether they are too conservative. 3!
Many scientists and geneticists even agree that the conventional
product rule (a method lacking ceiling principle safeguards) is
conservative, because the effects of population substructure are
negligible and would rarely have a negative effect on a defendant.
32
127. Concern about the ceiling principle centers around what some call a lack of scientific basis
or an arbitrariness to the NRC's proposal. See B. Devlin et al., Statistical Evaluation of DNA
Fingerprinting: A Critique of the NRCs Report, 259 Science 748, 837 (1993).
128. "We agree ... [the ceiling principle] is extremely conservative." Id. Even two of the
original critics of DNA statistical analysis, Hartl and Lewontin, wnte that the interim ceiling
principle is conservative. Daniel L. Hartl and Richard C. Lewontin, DNA Fingerprinting Report,
260 Science 473, 474 (1993) ("Everyone agrees [the interim ceiling principle] is conservative, and
some believe that it is too conservative."). Contra Jennifer R. Slimowitz and Joel E. Cohen,
Violations of the Ceiling Principle: Exact Conditions and Statistical Evidence, 53 Am. J. Hum.
Genet. 314, 316 (1993) (suggesting that the ceiling principle could fail to be conservative under
simplified and highly artificial conditions).
129. In 1989, Dr. Lander was one of the first to express concern over the adequacy of population
databases and the effect of population substructuring on probability statistics. Eric Lander, DNA
Fingerprinting on Trial, 339 Nature 501, 501-05 (1989). Lander is an associate professor of
biology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and director of the MIT Center for Genome
Research, with expertise in human genetics, molecular biology, population genetics, mathematics,
and statistics. DNA Technology, supra note 3, at 175.
130. Affidavit of Dr. Eric S. Lander, State v. Dyer, No. 93-1-00489-0 (King County Super. Ct.
September 20, 1993).
131. Peter Aldhous, Geneticists Attack NRC Report as Scientifically Flawed, 259 Science 755,
755 (1993) (pointing to a "rash of papers" from population geneticists mid statisticians which argue
the NRC, which proposed the ceiling and interim ceiling principle "erred too far on the side of
caution in trying to address concerns"); see also Hart], supra note 128.
132. DNA Technology, supra note 3, at 12.
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Others believe there is no method that will absolutely guarantee
conservative estimated match probabilities When there are small
departures from Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium or linkage equilibrium.133
Still, according to some of the same scientists, such departures are
unlikely to seriously compromise most estimates derived from the
interim ceiling principle.'34
While the weight to be given probability statistics can be debated,
conservative probability statistics should be admissible under the Frye
threshold test. Conservative estimates satisfy Frye's courtroom test of
reliability by providing estimates that avoid undue prejudice against
defendants. Indeed, the possibility of a match being the result of
coincidence is remote, even when the most conservative statistical
calculations are used.
35
Because conservative probability statistics provide a way of
preserving reliability and minimizing undue prejudice, juries should
know that "there was a match and that the possibility of the perpetrator
being someone other than the defendant is remote, even if it is difficult to
say precisely how remote."'36 Juries will not be irreversibly mesmerized
The discriminating power of DNA profiles is so high, and the chance of a fortuitous match so
low, that the precision with which a frequency is estimated is rarely, if ever, going to have an
unnecessarily prejudicial effect on the decisions of a court. Each of us has demonstrated this
last point by simulating cases in which data bases of the wrong ethnic group are deliberately
used.
B.S. Weir and I.W. Evett, Reply to Lewontin, 52 Am. J. Hum. Genet. 206, 206 (1993) (also stating
that concerns about the effect of population substructure has academic validity, but when
experiments are carried out on real data, "the practical effects of lack of independence" are "minor");
see also, I.W. Evett et al., An Illustration of the Advantages of Efficient Statistical Methods for RFLP
Analysis in Forensic Science, 52 Am. J. Hum. Genet. 498, 504 (1993); Ranajit Chakraborty et al.,
Evaluation of Standard Error and Confidence Interval of Estimated Multilocus Genotype
Probabilities, and Their Implications in DNA Forensics, 52 Am. J. Hum. Genet. 60, 69 (1993)
(stating that "irrespective of the racial/ethnic origin of individuals, most five-locus DNA profiles
have a frequency no larger than 1 in 1 million, in fixed-bin data"); I.W. Evett, DNA Statistics:
Putting the Problems Into Perspective, 156 Justice Peace 583, 583-86 (1992).
133. Krane, supra note 21, at 10,587.
134. Id.
135. See supra note 107.
136. People v. Mohit, 579 N.Y.S.2d 990,993 (Co. Ct. 1992). "[The fact that it is difficult, given
the present state of knowledge, to be precise, does not mean that conservative methods cannot be
used." Id. at 999.
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by probability statistics, because cross-examination can uncover flaws
and uncertainties in the statistics presented.
137
Without a doubt, the admissibility of probability statistics in DNA
evidence must be determined according to a high standard of science and
a high standard of justice. Conservative methods of calculating
probability statistics, like the ceiling and interim ceiling principle, meet
these standards. Such conservative methods provide powerful
evidence, 13' and a strong argument can be made that the ceiling and
interim ceiling principles, in particular, are generally accepted as erring
in favor of defendants.139 While scientists may disagree on the best
method of calculating probability statistics, this disagreement should not
preclude the admission of powerful forensic evidence, when uncertainties
are resolved in favor of defendants.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Cauthron court reaffirmed and clarified the Frye test in the state
of Washington and held that the underlying theory of DNA evidence and
the RFLP method of DNA typing are generally accepted and admissible.
When it came to the admissibility of probability statistics, however, the
Cauthron decision provided unclear guidance, leaving this pivotal issue
unresolved for future courts. Washington courts should fill this void by
admitting the valuable and powerful tool of DNA evidence when
conservative probability statistics are used.
137. Attorneys, for example, could ask experts when the statistical method might fail to be
conservative and whether those circumstances were present in calculating the probability statistics at
issue.
138. See supra note 107.
139. See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
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